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Abstract 
We investigate the role of Italian firms to evaluate their role on labour productivity performance. We 
find that family owned firms are less efficient than their no-family counterparts and also that family 
management negatively affects labour productivity. Furthermore, we estimate the role of firm level 
bargaining to verify whether family controlled firms, adopting these types of agreements, may partially 
close their efficiency gap with respect to their competitors. We find that enterprises under family 
governance obtain significant efficiency gains when they adopt firm level bargaining, greater than those 
obtained by their no-family counterparts.  
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Enterprise-level bargaining and labour productivity of Italian family firms: a quantile 
regression analysis  
Introduction 
The presence of family-influenced firms is a common trait in many economies and their role on 
enterprise performance animates an ongoing debate (Chrisman et al 2010)i. Two main alternative 
perspectives have been proposed, as reviewed by Bertrand and Schoar (2006). The first one considers 
family firms more risk averse than their nonfamily counterparts (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), reluctant to 
change and plagued by conflicts of interests between founding families and minority owners. The second 
opposite view, based on efficiency arguments, sets the comparative advantage of family firms, associated 
with their long term horizons (Habbershon, 1999), to their lower agency costs for alignment of interests 
inside the firm (Jensen	   and	  Meckling	   1976),	   and to their role as a weak substitute for poor investor 
protection (Burkart et al. 2003).  
The diffusion of family controlled firms has been documented for a number of countries, among others 
the US (Anderson and Reeb 2003), Western Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002), and Eastern Asian 
economies (Claeesens et al. 2000). However, so far, empirical evidence on their role is sparse (Maury, 
2006) and, since no conclusive results have been obtained (Schulze and Gedajlovich, 2010), additional 
research remains of paramount importance, especially for countries, such as Italy, typically dominated by 
small enterprises whose ownership and control are mainly concentrated in the hands of families 
(Cucculelli et al. 2014). Furthermore, previous studies have mainly focused on financial performance, 
whereas limited evidence is available on productivity results, with only few exceptions (Palia and 
Lichtenberg, 1999; Barbera and Moores, 2013; Cucculleli et al. 2014). Also, as stressed by Martikainen et 
al. (2009, p.2 96), what remains poorly explored is the specific ‘microeconomic mechanism’ through 
which various factors may affect family firm results.  
Differently from most of the available studies, our contribution concerns productivity performances of 
Italian family firms. By using a unique and rich data set for the Italian economy, provided by ISFOL 
(Istituto per lo Sviluppo della Formazione Professionale dei Lavoratori – Institute for the Development of 
Workers Professional Training), we first estimate the association of family ownership and control with 
productivity of Italian enterprises. Second, we estimate the role of the specific mechanism represented by 
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firm level bargaining (FLB) to verify whether family controlled firms, adopting this type of agreements, 
may partially close their efficiency gap with respect to their competitors. Notice that FLB agreements, 
that cover an ample range of matters, have been recommended by the European Central Bank to countries 
facing structural crises in reforming labour markets. Their role is to increase the flexibility of wage and 
labour policies and to correlate these policies with specific requirements of individual enterprises 
(European Commission, 2011)ii. This is an important issue for a country that has recorded, in the last 
decades, one the worst performances in terms of productivity growth and has been steadily losing 
competitiveness in world markets (Barba Navaretti et al. 2008). Our empirical strategy allows us to 
verify, among the proposed explanations, not only the predominance of small firms, their sectoral 
specialisation, and their limited recourse to outside professional managers (Bank of Italy, 2009), but also 
their insufficient adoption of decentralised agreements, closely linked to firm specific needs, and thus 
tailored to dealing with international competitive pressures.  
The results suggest that enterprises under family governance obtain significant efficiency gains when 
they adopt firm level bargaining, greater than those obtained by their no-family counterparts. Family-
based corporate governance may shape industrial relations policies, such as performance related pay, 
employee training and team-based production systems, in an efficient way. The direct involvement of 
family when they adopt human resource management practices, negotiated in FLB, may induce a 
‘relational governance’ that leads to a strategic commitment to employees. Thus, family ties may alleviate 
problems of contractual enforcement and imperfect information (De Paola and Scoppa, 2001) and the 
high level of ‘emotional involvement’ of family members may enhance communication, transmission of 
tacit knowledge and mobilization of human resources (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996).  
To verify these hypotheses we have organized the paper as follows: section 1 briefly discusses the 
related literature; section 2 presents the data used and descriptive statistics; section 3 illustrates the 
econometric framework employed and section 4 our estimation results; section 5 concludes. 
Discussion 
Literature Review 
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The enterprise run by families is largely the predominant form that typically prevails in US and 
European economies (La Porta et. 1999, Burkart et al. 2003, Faccio and Lang, 2002) and a wide-ranging 
literature has focused on its effects on firm outcomes.   
However, to date no consensus has been reached on a unique exact definition of family firms as 
shown, for instance, by the nearly thirty articles published in top journals and examined by Miller et al. 
(2007). In this literature, a large field of research, inaugurated by the seminal work of Berle and Means 
(1932), defines family firms as those which are “either owned, controlled, and/or managed by a family 
unit” (see also Barbera and Moores, 2013, p. 954). Another strand of research proposes a clearer 
distinction between family firms managed by external managers or run by family members; finally, other 
studies consider separately family firms run by founders from those run by founders’ successors	  
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006, Cucculelli and Micucci 2008).  
In the literature review of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Bertrand and Schoar (2006), two 
contradictory perspectives of family enterprises have been proposed, sometimes named the ‘agency’ and 
the ‘stewardship’ views (Miller et al. 2008, Chirico and Bau 2014).  
In the first one, the agency perspective, family members act on the basis of self interest and their 
conduct leads to a misalignment of objectives between those of family members and of other firm actors 
(minority owners and firm stakeholders). Thus, enterprises run by families are exposed to specific forms 
of agency costs because the strategies of their owners are mainly oriented at pursuing private benefits of 
control (such as related-party transactions, special dividends, excessive compensations for family 
management, redistribution of rents from employees to family members, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Also, family firms usually suffer mismanagement, due to the inefficient selection of executives, 
frequently chosen among family members rather than from a pool of external and talent managers. One 
related aspect is nepotism and rigid inheritance norms, with the consequence that family firms, run by 
second and later generation family managers, frequently underperform with respect to firms run by 
founding owners (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008), thus dynastic management 
might cause a decline in the return of assets (Bennedsen et al., 2007).  
Aspects closely related to the focus of our paper, e.g. labour productivity, are offered by studies that 
analyse the role of human and organizational resources in family firms. For instance, Caselli and 
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Gennaioli, 2013) find that dynastic management reduces a firm’s total factor productivity. Bloom and van 
Reenen (2007) analyse management practices across firms of four countries, the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany. They find that half of the substantial cross-country differences in the 
quality of management disappear when they control for the greater incidence of family firms managed by 
descendants of the founder as well as intensity of product market competition. They show that in family 
enterprises, especially those that select the CEO on the basis of primogeniture, managers are of low 
quality, their effort is low effective, and inferior management practices are usually adopted.  
The second view, the stewardship perspective, portrays family firms as organizations in which family 
owners are ‘stewards’ of the firm. Their conduct, driven by loyalty and commitment to reputation, may 
assure the long-run survival of their business, also through generous investments and profitable 
relationships with all stakeholders, thus enhancing the firm value and assuring its transmission to future 
generations (Habbershon, 1999). The lengthy tenure of family firms assures superior oversight and 
monitoring of management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and more incentives in active control. This is also 
because concentrated ownership, that typifies family firms, reduces the free rider problem that usually 
affects dispersed ownership. In addition, as shown by Mueller and Phillipon (2011, p. 219), family firms 
are ‘a natural response’ in countries where the climate of working relations is hostile, because “due to 
their longer time horizons, family owners may have a comparative advantage at sustaining implicit labor 
contracts, which may be reciprocated by workers with cooperative behavior.” 
Thus, it is expected that a set of psychological traits such as motivation, self-control, fairness and a 
cooperative attitude provide important enforcement mechanisms for labour discipline and long-term 
employment relationships, mainly in workplaces characterised by incomplete contracts (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000). These traits may often pervade family firms that better socialise employees (Habbershon, 
1999), promote their commitment to firm aims, provide a climate of labour relations characterised by 
employee involvement and dedication, and devote  efforts to obtain motivation, training and loyalty from 
their employees (Miller et al. 2008). Furthermore, Habberson et al. (2003) consider a set of idiosyncratic 
traits, such as the firm’s potential for trust, leadership development and human resource policies, that 
creates a pool of resources and capabilities, unique to the family unit. In this resource view of the firm, 
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individual family members create unique systemic conditions, e.g. “complex arrays of systemic factors 
that impact strategy processes and firm performance outcomes.” (Habberson et al. (2003, p.952) 
The evolution of social norms, based on gift exchange and efficiency wages that enhance reputation, 
trust and learning processes (Bowles, 1998) are relevant aspects of the working environment. In this 
perspective, De Paola and Scoppa (2001) explore the role of reputation in firms that employ members of 
the same families and show that the no shirking condition in these enterprises allows the firm to pay 
lower efficiency wages.  
Summing up, this short discussion suggests that the relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance is complex and multifaceted. We expect that negative characteristics of family ownership 
and management might be mitigated by firm level good practices. Our main hypothesis, tested below, is 
that the positive idiosyncratic traits of family firms, such as trust and superior human resource policies, 
are activated only when favourable firm level institutional settings emerge, for instance those agreements, 
recommended by the European Commission (2011) and the ECB (2011)iii, that adapt wages and working 
conditions to the specific needs of companies and that in the Italian economy are still too poorly 
implemented. 
The Italian institutional setting  
The importance of family business involvement may be seen in its interactions with other aspects of 
corporate governance and country formal institutions (Bertrand ad Schoar, 2006).  In Italy, governance 
structures are founded on family capitalism (more than 75 percent of listed firms are family controlled), 
the predominance of small business (the incidence of firms with less than 10 employees is 14 percentage 
points higher than the European average), the widespread use of pyramidal groups (family-controlled 
pyramids represented 20 percent of market capitalization at the end of the 1990s) and the limited role of 
banks and other financial companies that do not hold significant stakes in industrial companies (Bianco 
and Casavola, 1999, Aganin and Volpin, 2005, Bianco et al. 2013).  
Furthermore, the lack of supervisory boards or work council-type bodies leads to the absence of 
formal rights of employees to influence key managerial strategies. Thus, a central role ends up being 
assigned to family governance and, concerning labour relations, the impact of firm level bargaining aimed 
at increasing flexibility in working conditions and wages appears particularly relevant. From the early 
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Nineties, Italy has been characterised by a two-tiered bargaining regime, established by the July 1993 
National Income Agreement. This agreement was the first attempt to create a systematic regulation for 
collective bargaining, characterised by industry-wide bargaining at the first level and decentralised 
bargaining at the second level. In this institutional setting, first-level contracts, linked to the target 
inflation rate, were intended to guarantee the purchasing power of wages, whereas decentralised 
bargaining was intended to distribute wage premiums, linked to productivity or firm results. In addition, 
decentralised bargaining (at the firm or territory level) addresses a number of other matters, such as 
working time, employee training, labour organisation, and union relations. These negotiations may 
promote reorganisation and innovation of productive processes and recently there have been calls for new 
rules aimed at amplifying the importance of the decentralised level of negotiationsiv, so that reforming the 
Italian bargaining setting  is the subject of current debate.  
The implementation of firm level bargaining (FLB) reached so far and its influence on the productivity 
of Italian family firms are examined in the next sections.  
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our empirical analysis is based on information obtained by the Employer and Employee Surveys 
(RIL) that were conducted by ISFOL in 2007 and 2010 on a representative sample of partnerships and 
limited liability firms that operated in the non-agricultural private sector. The ISFOL-RIL surveys collect 
a rich set of information about employment composition, personnel organization, industrial relations and 
other workplace characteristics.  
In the year 2010 a further section was inserted in the RIL questionnaire to collect information 
regarding some characteristics of corporate governance, ownerships/ control and management structure. 
We define family firms (FF) as those controlled or owned by an individual or a family and non-family 
firms (NFF) all others. Thus we constructed a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is 
owned/controlled by a family (Family firms, FF) and 0 otherwise (Non-family firms, NFF). Furthermore, 
in the ISFOL-RIL questionnaire each firm was asked if the person who manages the enterprise is i) a 
member of the family that owns or controls the company; ii) a manager hired from inside the company; 
iii) a manager hired from outside the company. We thus divided family firms into two types of firms: 
family management (FM) (answer i) and no-family management NFM (answers ii and iii)v. Finally, we 
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selected the subsample of firms not involved in mergers and acquisitions in order to limit our analysis to 
those enterprises whose ownership and control structure remains unchanged in the observation period. 
Concerning our key explanatory variable, in the RIL questionnaire each firm was asked whether or not 
a firm level bargaining agreement (FLB) has been adopted. These firm level agreements in Italy cover 
several issues, such as working time, variable pays, employee training, labour organisation, and union 
relations. Thus, we constructed a dummy variable indicating the existence or not of an FLB contract for 
each year under study. 
In addition, we have information on the occupation composition of the labour force within the firm 
(executives, blue- and white collars), gender, type of contract (long-term/short-term) and other firm 
strategies (innovation and export). We also control for sectors and regions (NUTS 1) in which firms are 
located.  
Each RIL cross-section for the years 2007 and 2010 counts about 25,000 firms, whereas its 
longitudinal component over the period 2007-2010 counts about 12,000 firms. In order to link 
information concerning workers’ characteristics to indicators of firm performance and accounting 
variables, a sub-sample of the RIL dataset was merged with balance-sheet information from the AIDA 
archives.  
Then the longitudinal RIL-AIDA merged sample was restricted to those limited liability companies 
that disclose detailed accounts following the scheme of the 4th Directive CEE. We also excluded firms 
with less than five employees to retain only those firms characterized by a minimum level of 
organizational structure. This criterion of selection, which is consistent with the focus of our paper, 
allows us to avoid excluding all micro-firms (those with less than 10 employees) whose incidence in 
Italy, as stated above, is the highest in Europe: in 2008, their share of total value added was 
approximately 33 percent, well above the European average of only 19 percent (Bank of Italy, 2013, p. 
5). Furthermore, we excluded firms with missing data for the key variables. Therefore, the sample that 
we use in the first specifications amounts to a no-balanced panel of about 7,700 firms during the period 
2007-2010.vi  
Finally, we also collected information from AIDA to set up our instrumental variable quantile 
regression approach, thoroughly discussed below. The instrument is a measure of sales volatility that 
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firms experienced in the past (the standard deviation of sales over the period 1998-2000) that we 
transformed into a binary variable according to the quantile treatment effect technique (Abadie et al., 
2002). It is worth noting that information on lagged sales volatility, used as instrument for FLB (1 when 
this volatility is higher than the median value recorded in the industry in which the firm is included and 0 
otherwise), is available only for a restricted sub-sample of firms (about 4700 observations in the total 
pooled sample). This means that by performing instrumental variable regressions we made a double 
robustness check. First, we took into account endogeneity and second we performed estimates on a 
different, more restricted sample of firms. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in Table A1. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the pooled sample 2007-2010. We find that about 80  percent 
of firms are owned by families, (FF) and that the large majority of these firms, 92  percent, are run by 
family management (FM). Thus, the main characteristic of the Italian case, considering both 
manufacturing and service sectors, is not the prevalence of family owned firms, which is a common trait 
of many other countries, but the predominance of family managed firms, that represent only a minority in 
other economies (one third in Spain, and only one fourth in France and Germany, Accetturo et al. 2013). 
Data reported in Table 1 also show the limited diffusion of FLB, on average in 15 percent of the whole 
sample, with a higher diffusion in non-family firms (NFM), that register a percentage of 29 percent, and a 
lower diffusion among family firms, particularly among firms run by family management, 11 percent, 
whereas family firms run by external management show a higher incidence (17 percent). Interestingly, we 
have a correspondence between FLB diffusion and the magnitude of sales volatility that firms 
experienced in the past. Indeed, the highest value of sales volatility (log sales st.dev.) is in NFM firms 
(13.55), that are also those firms that adopt the highest number of FLBvii. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
NFF firms, as shown by the last column of Table 1, are also more efficient and more frequently 
represented in international markets as exporters, although they are no longer active in process or product 
innovation projects than family enterprises. In addition, we find that differences among firms, classified 
by corporate governance indicators, also concern workforce characteristics. NFF hire more executives 
and white collars and make less use of fixed-term contracts. The opposite is true for FF firms, especially 
for the FM subgroup. Finally, the sectoral distribution of firms shows some differences among different 
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groups, with a lower presence of NFF in Construction and Textiles, and a higher presence in Finance 
(Intermediation and other business services) and in Transports and Communications.  
Summing up, the overall portrait which describes the typical profile of a family firm involved is 
unambiguous: they are less successful in terms of per capita value added, less present in international 
markets, less active in terms of outlays in investments, not particularly involved in incentive strategies 
and in high quality personnel policies bargained in firm level negotiations with their workforce and more 
present in traditional sectors. 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of labour productivity (per capita value added) referring to FLB Firms 
(those that adopt firm level bargaining) and Other Firms (those that do not adopt firms level bargaining). 
The comparison is performed for all sub-samples, distinguished on the basis of ownership and 
management. We find that the distribution referring to FLB firms is slightly placed to the right of that 
concerning Other Firms (firms without FLB) for all typologies of family firms. By contrast, for no-family 
firms, we have more firms without FLB (Other firms)  in the end of the upper tail. These first 
comparisons encouraged us to further explore the existence of possible different relations between FLB 
and enterprise performance for family and non-family firms. 
In view of our focus on heterogeneity, for each type of firm we single out the incidence of FLB along 
the productivity distribution, organised by quartiles. (Table 2). This allows us to check whether 
differences among firms, grouped according to owners and managers, but also ranked by productivity, are 
related to adoption of FLB. First, we observe that, for each quartile, NFF firms record a more diffuse 
presence of FLB; second, we obtain, as common trait for each group of firms, that FLB diffusion is 
increasing along the productivity distribution, at least up to the 3rd QR. However, after this quartile some 
fundamental differences emerge. Only in family led enterprises placed at the highest quantiles of the 
productivity distribution the increasing tendency persists, suggesting that only best performing firms, 
owned and managed by families, are also more intensively involved in collective actions with their 
employees. These findings clearly suggest that addressing the question of heterogeneity is particularly 
relevant in the Italian case, as seen below. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Econometric strategy and results 
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Estimation strategy 
In this section we present the empirical strategy we used to estimate the role of family involved firms. 
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the relationship between labour productivity and 
governance variables. In particular, the relationship between labour productivity and family ownership 
and control may be formalized by a production function augmented by a dummy variable capturing the 
role of family ownership and inserting the set of other controls for firm characteristics and workforce 
composition.  
We first estimate the following equation:  
(1) 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷!!,!,! + 𝜗 ∙ 𝐹!,! + 𝜇! + 𝛾! + 𝜂! + 𝜀!,!          !!  !""#,!"#" 
where ln !! !,! is the (log of) valued added per employee, is the (log of) physical capital per 
employee, DFF represents a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is owned and/or controlled 
by a family and zero otherwise (1). The parameter associated with DFF  measures	   whether	   firms	  owned/controlled	   by	   a	   family	   are	   more	   or	   less	   productive	   than	   no-­‐family	   firms.	   The vector Fit 
denotes controls for other firms’ characteristics and workforce composition. The parameter µs denotes 
sector specific fixed effects, γj regional (NUTS1_level) fixed effects for macro-areas,  represents year 
fixed effects and  is the error term capturing the idiosyncratic component of labor productivity. 
Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to family firms and insert a dummy variable, DFM, among 
regressors, that equals 1 if the firm is managed by a member of the owner/ controlling family and zero 
otherwise. Thus we estimate the following equation: 
(1’) 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷!",!,! + 𝜗 ∙ 𝐹!,! + 𝜇! + 𝛾! + 𝜂! + 𝜀!,!          !!  !""#,!"#" 
Analogously to equation (1), DFM measures whether firms managed by a family member are more or 
less efficient than family firms run by external managers. Concerning other controls, we replicate the 
estimation strategy of equation 1. 
In a further step, our key aim is to estimate the effect of FLB on labour productivity for different 
groups of firms; we thus insert a dummy variable, capturing the incidence of FLB, and include all 
controls for firm characteristics and workforce composition. The following equation is estimated: 
itL
K
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ln
tη
itε
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(2) 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐿𝐵!,! + 𝜗 ∙ 𝐹!,! + 𝜇! + 𝛾! + 𝜂! + 𝜀!,!          !!  !""#,!"#" 
where FLB represents a dummy variable indicating the presence of firm level bargaining. 
We started with a pooled cross section analysis of equations (1), (1’) and (2), controlling for time fixed 
effects. We prefer pooled sample estimates because we have only two years and an unbalanced panel 
dataset, with different number of observations for each year. Notice that restrictions of data over time is a 
serious constraint that limits the possibility to account for unobserved heterogeneity with fixed effect 
estimates and thus to explore within variability of firm labour productivity. However, we may address the 
importance of between firm variability by taking into account heterogeneity across firms. We started with 
the classical Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator: 
(3)   𝛽! ,𝜹! = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜌! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! − 𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐿𝐵!,! − 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿!,!  
(4)   𝛽! ,𝜹! = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜌! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! − 𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐿𝐵!,! − 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿!,!  
where 𝛽 is the coefficient of interest, 𝜹 is a vector of coefficients for all control variables, that are now 
included in the matrix 𝑿, 𝜏 is the specific conditional quantile to be estimated and 𝜌! is the asymmetric loss 
function 𝜌! 𝑢 = 1 𝑢 > 0 ∙ 𝜏 𝑢 + 1 𝑢 ≤ 0 ∙ (1 − 𝜏) 𝑢  and 𝑢  is the expected error. 
For labour productivity we estimated five different quantile regressions with 𝜏 = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75  and  0.9. In addition, we addressed heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrap standard 
errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). As well known, the QR approach is more robust to outliers and provides 
information about the relationships between FLB and the dependent variables at different points of their 
conditional distribution. However, the Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator does not allow us to distinguish 
between casual effects and spurious correlation between FLB and productivity, that will typically arise if 
more productive firms more likely adopt FLB agreements. Thus, if there are unobserved factors influencing 
the adoption of FLB, the estimated effect on productivity will be biased. To avoid these relationships 
remaining obscured, the issue of endogeneity has to be taken into account. The binary nature of our key 
explanatory variable (FLB) led us to handle endogeneity within the context of the treatment effect 
techniques. As we will discuss below, in the instrumental variable quantile method used in our estimates, we 
compared the performance of both treated firms (firms adopting FLB scheme) and the control group (firms 
that do not adopt FLB schemes) to have a counterfactual analysis. The volatility of sales at the firm level, 
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recorded in the past (over the period 1998-2000) viii may be a valid instrument because it is a proxy of 
uncertainty; at the same time, by using more than a one year lag for this instrument, it is plausible to assume 
that it is orthogonal to labour productivity observed several years later. Thus, our instrument is expected to 
randomly affect the sample firms, but at the same time also influences the probability that firms introduce 
FLB. The rational behind this, is that unstable market conditions, captured by sales volatility, enhances the 
probability of decentralized agreements which typically enhance flexibility in work organization and pay. 
This hypothesis finds support from the Italian experience where FLB, that includes negotiations on labour 
flexibility (job rotation, provision of training, changes in working hours), is most widely adopted by Italian 
companies as strategies of adaptation to fluctuating demand and as responses to variable, uncertain, external 
pressures (see the EIRO report, 1997)ix.  
A first objection is that previous sales volatility may be related to potential components of productivity. It 
is likely that different propensities to exports, as well as technology and innovation strategies may affect 
volatility of sales. For instance, firms that export and operate geographical diversification of their markets or 
operate in (high-tech) sectors, that use superior technology, may have different volatility of sales from other 
firms. However, in our estimates we control for internationalisation and innovation strategies, related to 
technical changes (process innovation) or diversification of markets (product innovation). In addition, the 
potential biases mentioned above are also mitigated by including industry dummies that capture sector-
specific technological factors.  
Furthermore, notice that FLB also includes agreements on wage flexibility, e.g. provisions that link pay 
levels more closely to the enterprise’s performance; thus a second objection is that volatility of sales may 
lead to a lower, not higher adoption of FLB agreements, because risk-averse employees will be reluctant to 
accept these agreements (Prendergast, 1999). However, in the Italian institutional setting, workers benefit 
from an incentive contract in any state of the world because the variable wage component is added to the 
base wage, set in the first sectoral level, and could be zero if the firm does not gain positive results; thus also 
risk averse employees do not face any trade off from variable pays. 
Concerning our estimation strategy, we use two different methods: i) the Quantile Treatment Effect 
Estimator of Abadie, et al. (2002) (IVQR_AAI); ii) the traditional Two-Stages Least Absolute Deviation 
Estimator (IVQR_2LAD) of Amemya (1982).  
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The IVQR_AAI estimator, that allows us to look at the impact of FLB throughout the labor productivity 
distribution by tackling endogeneity, presents some specific different characteristics. It is based on a binary 
endogenous variable and a binary instrument. Thus, we transformed the past sales’ volatility of the firm in a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the firm experienced a volatility higher than the median volatility 
recorded by the others, and 0 otherwise. The Abadie et al (2002) conditional quantile treatment effects 
estimator (IVQR_AAI) can be applied only if both endogenous variable and instrument are binary variables. 
Furthermore, the causal effect is identified only for the sub-population of compliers. In our case, the 
compliers are firms whose estimated probability to adopt a FLB scheme is correlated to the higher estimated 
probability of having experienced a past volatility of sales above the median. In our sample these compliers 
are about 72 percent of all firms adopting FLB. Following Abadie, et al.(2002), the conditional quantile 
treatment effect for compliers can be estimated consistently by the following weighted quantile regressions: 
(5)   𝛽!"! ,𝜹!"! = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑊!,!!!" ∙ 𝜌! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! − 𝛽 ∙ 𝑆𝐿𝐵!,! − 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿!,!  
(6)   𝛽!"! ,𝜹!"! = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑊!,!!!" ∙ 𝜌! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! − 𝛽 ∙ 𝑆𝐿𝐵!,! − 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿!,!  
 (8)                       𝑊!,!!!" = 1 − !"#!,!∙ !!!"!,!!!!" !"!!|𝑿!,! − !!!"#!,! ∙!"!,!!" !"!!|𝑿!,!  
where SV is the binary instrument for volatility of sales and the weights 𝑊!,!!!"combine the endogenous 
variable and the instrumentx. As stated above, the instrument is assumed to hit the sample firms randomly, 
and the conditional probability of having a volatility above the median, 𝑃𝑟 𝑆𝑉 = 1|𝑿!,!  has been 
estimated by means of a non-parametric regression, that is the local logit estimation suggested by Frölich 
and Melly (2013). 
The IVQR_2LAD estimator consists in using the fitted values, obtained from estimates performed in a 
first step, and then inserting the fitted values for FLB as a covariate to give the LAD estimator of 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! 
in a second step. In our case, as mentioned above, the first step is a probit regression of FLB (our 
endogenous binary variable) on the binary instrument (sales volatility, SV) at the firm level. 
(7) 𝑃 𝐹𝐿𝐵!,! = 1 𝑆𝑉!,! ,𝑿𝒊,𝒕 = 𝚽 𝝃 ∙ 𝑆𝑉!,! + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿!,!  𝑿!,! are the firm level controls mentioned above.  
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In order to obtain consistent standard errors, we bootstrapped them in both the first stage and the 
second stage regressions (Arias et al. 2001; Bosio, 2009). Notice, however, that this approach relies on 
the symmetry of the composite error obtained in the second stage (see Wooldridge, 2010). 
Furthermore, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) show that this estimate is not consistent when the 
quantile treatment effect differs across quantiles and it is precisely in that case that the quantile 
regression method is interesting (see also Melly, 2005 and Bosio, 2009). For this reason we only keep 
the IVQR_2LAD estimator as IV conditional median estimation, that permits us to show the 
significance of the instrument (sales volatility) in the first stage. 
Results  
Labour productivity and family-influenced firms 
Tables 3 and 4 show the association between labour productivity and corporate governance structures. 
Firstly, for the whole sample we introduce as key regressor the dummy variable for family firms (Table 
3); secondly, we restrict the analysis to the FF subsample and  test the association between labour 
productivity and  family management (Table 4). Both sets of estimates also control for other firm and 
employee characteristics. From OLS estimates, we find that family owned firms are, on average, 20.8  
percent less efficient than their no-family counterparts (Table 3). In addition, within the subsample of 
family firms, family management negatively affects labour productivity by -9.8 percent (Table 4). 
By performing quantile regression (QR), we may also address the question of firms’ heterogeneity and 
study the effect of family ownership along different points of the productivity distribution. Also notice 
that QR estimates assign less weight to outliers and are robust to departures from normality, so that in 
cases of non-normal errors they are more efficient than OLS estimates (Buchinsky, 1998).  
[Insert Table 3], [Insert Table 4] 
In Table 3, we see that the coefficients of FF are negative, statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
and increasing across the productivity distribution, ranging from -0.15 at the 10th, to -0.29 at the 90th 
quantile. These results suggest that Italian firms, owned and controlled by families, are less productive 
than non-family firms, particularly high performers (-29 percent), thus confirming that, as such, owners 
often pursue family aims and private benefits of control according to the agency cost perspective 
mentioned above (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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Similar results are found when we consider heterogeneities in the subsample of family firms and 
estimate the role of family management, whose effect is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, 
across the whole distribution (Table 4). As discussed in Section 1, family management reduces the agency 
problem that usually arises from separation between ownership and control, but this positive effect may 
be offset by some costs because family management might underperform with respect to hired 
professional management, causing  a ‘failure of meritocracy’ (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013). In our case 
study, this failure is overwhelming as shown by the negative association between labour productivity and 
family management.   
With respect to other firm characteristics, as expected, we obtain a positive association of labour 
productivity with the capital stock per capita and, in line with other studies on Italian firms (see Hall et al. 
2009), with the propensity to export and the firm’s size. Controlling for the latter variable, measured by 
the log of employees, is particularly important because, as shown in related literature (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2006, p. 86), “We expect the stronger reliance on family members in the ownership and 
management of family firms to be associated with smaller size on average…Reliance on family members 
rather than professional managers may also lead to inefficiencies in decision making that will on average 
slow firm growth.”  
We also control for firm age that may be related to the quality of management and firm performance 
(see among others Levesque and Minniti, 2006). Opposite effects may be conceivable. First, it is likely 
that aging enhances experience and competence, induces the implementation of routines and allows 
management to improve over time, as recently found for the Italian case (Cucculelli et al. 2014). On the 
other hand, aging can negatively affect firm performance, inducing inertia, process rigidities, reluctance 
to innovation and obsolescence of initial endowments (Agrawal and Gort, 2002). Also notice that firm 
aging might be associated with higher probability that the firm’s founder is no longer present in the firm, 
and that the enterprise’s control has passed into the hands of his descendants, that usually destroy firm 
value (Villalonga and Amit, 2006)xi. Our results suggest that the positive aspect dominates the negative 
one (Tables 3 and 4), with the only exception for the lowest quantile for which no significant coefficients 
are found.  
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Estimations also control for worker heterogeneity,  e.g. for a number of other potential determinants of 
productivity including the socioeconomic characteristics of an individual (such as gender), and three 
occupational groups (managers and supervisors, white- and blue-collars). The hypothesis is that the 
heterogeneity of workers (differentiated by gender and skills) will influence the relationships we are 
testing. We find that employment positions play a role, so that the coefficients associated with executives 
and white-collar workers are positive and significant across the whole distribution, with respect to the 
omitted category, the blue collars. A plausible explanation is that managerial and more skilled employees 
have a higher relation with productivity.  
We also obtain the negative coefficient of fixed-term workers on labour productivity, but the QR 
analysis reveals some evidence of heterogeneity. The negative coefficients of fixed-term contracts are 
significant across the whole productivity distribution both in FF and FM estimates with a magnitude, in 
absolute value, that decreases at higher quantiles in FF and FM estimates. The higher coefficient for the 
lower end of the distribution suggests that, especially in low performer firms that use temporary contracts 
as a cost cut strategy, these forms of job instability reduces investments in training and workers’ 
motivations, and end up deteriorating productivity prospects (Blanchard and Landier 2002).  
Finally, the estimates of Tables 3 and 4 seem to confirm that lower productivity gains are obtained 
when the proportion of women is higher. This is in line with other studies that find that female 
employees, on average, prefer activities that allow larger flexibility between job and family and have 
lower interdependence with other workers so that they are less involved in participative and more 
efficient work forms (Zwick, 2004). 
All estimates are obtained by including time, sector and regional (NUTS) dummies to control for time-
varying, sector-specific factors, as well as geographical disparities which likely influence the dependent 
variables and cannot be captured by the controls included in our analysis.  
Labour productivity and FLB: OLS and QR estimates  
Concerning the role of firm level bargaining, we briefly present the OLS and QR estimates  (Tables 5-
8), before focusing on the IV estimation (Table 9-11) that correct for endogeneity biases. All the results 
reported in these tables (5-11) are obtained by including the same control variables inserted in previous 
estimates. Thus, the group of firm characteristics includes size, age, and a group of variables related to 
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enterprise strategies: capital accumulation, export, innovation. We also reinsert worker characteristics and 
the same sector and regional (NUTS) dummies of our previous estimates. 
Concerning our key variable, the OLS results reported in Table 5 for the whole sample suggest that 
FLB is positively related to changes in productivity. From our QR results, the point estimates of FLB are 
positive and statistically significant across the whole distribution, although at different levels of 
significance and with higher coefficients at the highest quantiles. Analogous results have been obtained 
by replicating our estimation strategy for the FF and FM sub-samples (see, respectively, Tables 6 and 7), 
although for the 25th quantile the coefficient of FLB is not significant for the FM firms. This means that 
family involved firms, both in terms of ownership, but also in terms of active management, tend to exploit 
some of the advantages of firm level negotiations. On the contrary, as shown in Table 8, non-family firms 
(NFF) do not seem to gain significant improvements in labour productivity from bargaining with their 
workforce. Indeed, with the exception of the 75th quantile, we obtained no significant coefficients of FLB 
at the median value and other points of the productivity distribution.  
[Insert Table 5], [Insert Table 6], [Insert Table 7], [Insert Table 8] 
The findings for the NFF subsample confirm some major criticism on the bargaining setting and 
practices experienced so far in Italy, where the bargaining setting has come under pressure in recent 
years. For instance, some unions have argued that the system should be more flexible and suited to 
respond better and more rapidly to the specific and changing conditions faced by individual firms. Other 
workers’ representations have signalled the long delays in reaching agreement, often signed months 
after the old agreement has run out (European Trade Union Institute, 2014). These critical aspects likely 
concern particularly firms without a controlling family owner, that are more frequently larger 
organizations characterised by slower reactivity to changes, more ‘confrontational’ environments and 
bitter labour conflicts. By contrast, those family-controlled firms that may assure implementation of 
FLB more easily exploit advantages coming from these company agreements, that mainly consist in 
more flexibility and closer connections with the firm’s workforce. 
IV estimates  
Controlling for endogeneity confirms the positive and significant role of FLB on productivity and 
increases its measured impact. More precisely, we observe higher positive coefficients of FLB on the 
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productivity distributions (with respect to OLS and QR estimates with exogenous FLB) for the whole 
sample, as well as FF and FM sub-samples (see, respectively Tables 9, 10, 11). The IVQR_AAI estimates 
for FF (Table 10) show that the coefficient of FLB stays within the range 0.433 (at the median value ) and 
0.609 (for the Q10th). For the FM firms, the range is between 0.407 and 0.582 (median and Q90th). 
We also show the results obtained by using the IVQR_2LAD method (reported in the last column of 
Tables 9-11). We use this estimator, that allows us to obtain the conditional median result (Chernozhukov 
and Hansen, 2005 and Melly 2005), also because it permits testing the statistical significance of the 
instrument obtained in the first stage (see Table A.2). From our results, the validity of our strategy is 
given by the coefficients of the volatility of sales (our external instrument described above) that shows the 
expected sign and is significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels (Table A2, Appendix). It seems to 
confirm that our instrumental variable helps reduce the downward bias due to measurement errors 
(Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
For both the whole sample and the FF firms (Tables 9 and 10), we found a ‘U shaped’ relationship 
between FLB and the dependent variable (the magnitude of coefficients decreases, moving from the 
lowest quantile to the median quantile, and increases again at the 90th quantile). These findings suggest 
that, especially for low and high performers, firm level agreements provide incentives and appropriate 
labour flexibility arrangements that improve enterprise performance.  
By rerunning the estimates for the FM group (Table 11), we find that FLB is still significant at the 1 
percent level,  with point estimates lower with respect to the FF sample at all quantiles but the Q90th. All 
these findings were obtained by controlling for the wide set of firm and worker characteristics, time, 
sector and regional dummies, introduced also in the OLS and QR estimates, discussed above. 
Finally, Table 12 shows the results for non-family firms. For this subsample, we obtain significant 
impacts of FLB only at the Q10th and the Q75th, whereas for the rest of the distribution the insignificant 
impacts already found in OLS and conventional QR estimates (see Table 8) are confirmed. Also notice 
that for the NFF group the correction introduced with IV estimates is not significantxii (Table A2, 
Appendix).  
[Table 9], [Table 10], [Table 11], [Table 12] 
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To summarise, one plausible interpretation of all previous results is that FLB activates advantages of 
family involvement, thus permitting the achievement of positive outcomes from agreements on labour 
and wage flexibility. Indeed, it is conceivable that family owners, who sign firm level contracts, may also 
be oriented to consolidate their market position through investing in cooperative relations with their 
workforce. It means that negotiations on labour flexibility and wage incentives may reveal distinctive 
features of those firms that are less subject to self interest and less prone to extract resources for personal 
aims. They are likely to elicit more effort from their subordinates, obtain their higher commitment and 
thus experience higher firm performance. In addition, it is conceivable that family owners, with large 
ownership stakes, have more incentives to bear the costs of active labour relations. By contrast, this 
activism is less relevant in non-family firms where, in conformity with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), 
hired managers tend to prefer a ‘quiet life’ and are less prone to be involved in monitoring and supervisor 
activities.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
The literature on family business requires very detailed data and, as suggested by Bertrand and Schoar 
(2006), may benefit from microeconomic studies that proceed on a country by country basis and that 
enhance our understanding of the nexus between family and firms (p. 95).  
This paper has attempted to make a step in this direction. Its contribution has been to empirically 
evaluate the role of Italian family firms by using labour productivity as a measure of their performance 
rather than profitability or firm value, usually adopted in most related works.  
Our results firstly suggest that by taking into account the diversity of ownership and management 
permits a better understanding of the heterogeneity of Italian firms. A priori, two distinct, contradictory 
views may be conceivable. The first one, grounded on agency rationales, sees family owners as self 
serving at the expense of the efficient functioning and success of the company. Comparative descriptive 
analyses, as well as OLS and Quantile estimates are in line with this prediction and indicate that the 
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presence of family owners and family managers is unambiguously negatively associated with gains in 
labour productivity.  
However, a second view, based on the stewardship of loyal family owners, considers family business 
as a favorable setting, that may engender strategic policies and positively affects efficient firm 
organization. We have tested whether firm level bargaining plays some role in reversing the previous 
negative results and in providing support to the stewardship view. Indeed, we showed that this is the case. 
In particular, the IV estimates have permitted us to estimate the causal effect of these decentralized 
agreements on the productivity of family involved firms. We found that family ability to exploit 
opportunities offered by local agreements with their workforce is positive and significant in family firms 
but not in non-family firms.  Thus, it is likely that family members who play an active role in day-to-day 
decisions and design appropriate incentives, such as those formalized in firm level bargaining, attach 
more relevance to the future prospects of the enterprise. In these companies, FLB, that also includes 
training programs and profit sharing schemes, ends up being a signal that reveals their strategic 
commitment to enhance firm competitiveness and likely benefits all stakeholders, including employees, 
along the line proposed by the ‘stewardship ’ view. Thus, family may provide “the springboard for a form 
of firm specific organizational capital known as family social capital”(Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010, p. 
196). 
This result is of great concern in Italy. FLB allows family leaders to sign strategic commitments to 
their employees, so that that family ownership and involvement may be an ‘effective organizational 
structure’ (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The clear political message is that an enhanced implementation of 
agreements on multiple and complementary human resource management practices (extensive employee 
training, team-based production systems, performance related pay), may partly mitigate the slowdown in 
Italian productivity growth experienced in last decades. The recent proposed changes to the two-tier 
system of bargaining, giving a greater role to negotiations at company level on issues such as working 
time and wage flexibility, might improve labour productivity and reduce the efficiency gap with major 
international competitors (European Trade Union Institute, 2014). Thus, removing the incomplete 
implementation of the Italian bargaining rules seems a valid response for improving both family 
enterprise performance and the Italian system of corporate governance. 
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Endnotes 
i Chrisman et al (2010) examine 25 articles that have been particularly influential in research on family 
businesses, identify common themes among those studies, and indicate directions for future research in the 
field. 
ii	  One reason behind the decentralisation of collective bargaining is to remove too-rigid wage and working 
conditions that lead to low workforce motivation and productivity and less competitive firms involved in 
global competition. However, the evidence about the influence of the degree of centralisation and 
coordination of collective bargaining on aggregate employment and unemployment remains inconclusive, as 
indicated in the OECD Employment Outlook, 2006. One crucial factor is whether wage bargaining agents 
internalise negative externalities of their wage demands in centralised settings.	  
iii See Draghi, M. and J.-C. Trichet (2011) ‘Letter to the Prime Minister of Italy’, 5 August. 
iv The 2009 agreement (Accordo Quadro Riforma degli Assetti Contrattuali, 22 January 2009) was signed by 
the government, the national employers' associations and the trade unions, with the exception of CGIL (one 
of the three main national representative organisations of employees). 
v We consider firms owned by families but run by external managers as distinct units with respect to firms 
owned and run by family members, whereas our data do not permit the separation of firms run by the ‘lone’ 
family founders from enterprises run by their heirs (i.e. inherited managers). 
vi The RIL Survey sample is stratified by size, sector, geographic area and the legal form of firms. Inclusion 
depends on firm size, measured by the total number of employees. This choice has required the construction 
of a ‘direct estimator’ to take into account the different probabilities of inclusion of firms belonging to 
specific strata. In particular, the direct estimator is defined for each sample unit (firm) as the inverse of the 
probability of inclusion in the sample. By using this estimator, the RIL sample reproduces all active firms for 
each stratum and, simultaneously, the total number of employees in a given stratum (size, sector, and other 
characteristics). 
vii	  We also performed a chi_squared test concerning the independence of FLB and sales volatility, after we 
transformed the latter into a binary variable. The null hypothesis of independence was rejected at the 1 
percent level of significance. 
viii As explained in the previous section, the volatility of sales is not available for all firms, hence robustness 
checks are performed on a restricted sample. 
ix http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/10/feature/it9710214f.htm. 
xWe estimated a modified version of 𝑊!,!!!" that allows only positive weights, see Abadie, et al. (2002) and 
Frölich and Melly (2013). 
xi	  This effect may be relevant in our case because the ISFOL database does not permit us to distinguish 
between family firms run by founders from those run by their successors and we cannot control for the 
identity of family managers.	  
xii	  This result might be related to the small number of observations of non-family firms. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics the pooled sample 2007-2010 
 Whole sample  FF  
FF  
NFF 
 
FM 
managemen  
NFM  
 Mean  St Dev Mean  St Dev Mean  St Dev Mean  St Dev Mean  St Dev 
           FLB 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.29 0.45 
Ln (value added per employee) 10.79 0.56 10.74 0.53 10.73 0.53 10.84 0.56 11.02 0.62 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 10.00 1.63 9.99 1.58 9.99 1.56 10.03 1.78 10.05 1.85 
Ln(sales st.dev., 1998-2000) 13.17 1.35 13.07 1.30 13.06 1.30 13.26 1.41 13.55 1.43 
Workforce caracteristics           
% executives 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 
% white collars 0.38 0.30 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.41 0.30 0.46 0.31 
% blue collars 0.58 0.31 0.61 0.30 0.61 0.30 0.53 0.32 0.48 0.33 
% women 0.34 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.36 0.27 
% fixed term contracts 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.13 
Firms characteristics            
Firrm age 25.21 16.53 25.09 15.87 24.98 15.74 26.27 17.44 25.70 19.02 
Process innov 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 
Product innov 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Export 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 
Size: 5 <  n of employees<15 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.28 0.45 
Size: 15 ≦n employees < 50 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.48 
Size: 50 ≦ n employees < 250 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.46 
Size: n of employees ≧250 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23 
Regions (NUTS1)           
North West 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48 
North East 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.30 0.46 
Centre 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.40 
South 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.13 0.34 
Sectors           
Textile, Wearing Apparel, Food Industry 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Other Manufacturing, Mining, Utilities 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.34 0.47 
Constructions 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.23 
Trade, hotels, restaurants 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
Transportation and communication 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.26 
Intermediation and other business service 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 
Education, health and private social services 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34 
           Observations. 11979  9492  8745  662  2450  
           Sorce: RIL-AIDA data; Note: descriptive statistics are performed with no sampling weights 
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Table2 
Incidence of FLB by quartile of productivity distribution 
	  
Total 
sample  
Family 
Firms   
Family 
management 
Firms  
Non-family 
management 
firms 
Non- 
family 
Firms  
	      
 
 1-25th 0.084 0.059 0.062 0.216 0.246 
25-50th 0.137 0.111 0.116 0.321 0.326 
50-75th 0.183 0.123 0.132 0.391 0.399 
75-100th 0.252 0.183 0.195 0.384 0.350 
 
          
total  0.15 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.29 
 
 
Figure 1  
Labour productivity distribution according to  firm level bargaining (2007-2010) 
Family Firms No Family Firms 
  
Family Firms with Family Management Family Firms without Family Management 
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Table 3 
OLS and Quantile Regressions: Family firms and Labor Productivity 
 
Quantile estimates  OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       Family firms -0.149*** -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.216*** -0.290*** -0.208*** 
 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) 
% executives 0.176 0.459*** 1.060*** 1.389*** 1.810*** 0.958*** 
 
(0.114) (0.075) (0.086) (0.088) (0.111) (0.078) 
%white collars 0.366*** 0.398*** 0.433*** 0.520*** 0.640*** 0.472*** 
 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) (0.022) 
% women -0.510*** -0.471*** -0.441*** -0.421*** -0.414*** -0.444*** 
 
(0.028) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.038) (0.022) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.579*** -0.473*** -0.365*** -0.258*** -0.159** -0.396*** 
 
(0.074) (0.041) (0.027) (0.034) (0.069) (0.037) 
Ln(firm seniority) 0.014 0.017** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.021* 0.013*   
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.054*** 0.019 0.011 0.000 -0.019 0.015 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) 
Product innovation 0.022 0.009 -0.004 -0.013 -0.038** -0.003 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
Export 0.087*** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) 
Ln(size) 0.054*** 0.039*** 0.020*** -0.006 -0.042*** 0.011**  
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
Year 2010 -0.102*** -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.052*** -0.047*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010) 
Constant 9.238*** 9.465*** 9.640*** 9.842*** 10.015*** 9.561*** 
 
(0.068) (0.046) (0.047) (0.056) (0.094) (0.046) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.181 0.183 0.189 0.203 0.218 0.306 
Observations 11979 
Notes: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level 
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Table 4.  
OLS and Quantile Regressions: Labor Productivity and Family Management (estimates for the family firms 
subsample) 
 
Quantile estimates  OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       Family management -0.116*** -0.094*** -0.063*** -0.067*** -0.072* -0.098*** 
 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.040) (0.019) 
% executives -(0.053) 0.235*** 0.568*** 0.989*** 1.348*** 0.587*** 
 
(0.090) (0.083) (0.098) (0.082) (0.141) (0.083) 
%white collars 0.338*** 0.399*** 0.436*** 0.490*** 0.576*** 0.424*** 
 
(0.035) (0.023) (0.014) (0.030) (0.039) (0.023) 
% women -0.496*** -0.450*** -0.422*** -0.415*** -0.407*** -0.429*** 
 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.037) (0.023) 
 % fixed term contracts -0.569*** -0.469*** -0.370*** -0.250*** -0.209*** -0.403*** 
 
(0.056) (0.040) (0.032) (0.037) (0.044) (0.039) 
Ln(firm seniority) (0.017) 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.032* 0.027*** 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.097*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.118*** 0.138*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.040* 0.022 0.020* 0.001 -0.01 0.027**  
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Product innovation (0.027) 0.013 -0.01 -0.008 -0.029 -(0.005) 
 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) 
Export 0.108*** 0.084*** 0.064*** 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.091*** 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.028) (0.012) 
Ln(size) 0.055*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.004 -0.023*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Year 2010 -0.113*** -0.074*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.045** -0.073*** 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) 
Constant 9.072*** 9.269*** 9.481*** 9.622*** 9.680*** 9.344*** 
 
(0.078) (0.047) (0.040) (0.045) (0.087) (0.050) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.193 0.184 0.177 0.179 0.183 0.297 
Observations 9492 
Notes: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level 
 
 
 
 
 
30	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Table  5 
OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity (Whole Sample) 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       FLB 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.092*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) (0.014) 
% executives 0.100 0.526*** 1.075*** 1.622*** 2.117*** 0.971*** 
 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.089) (0.101) (0.149) (0.085) 
%white collars 0.418*** 0.454*** 0.490*** 0.568*** 0.724*** 0.531*** 
 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.033) (0.021) 
% women -0.522*** -0.498*** -0.470*** -0.448*** -0.466*** -0.459*** 
 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) 
% fixed-term contracts -0.568*** -0.482*** -0.375*** -0.291*** -0.231*** -0.428*** 
 
(0.062) (0.034) (0.031) (0.036) (0.057) (0.034) 
Ln(firm seniority) 0.009 0.013* 0.004 0.000 -0.002 (0.002) 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.140*** 0.123*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.047*** 0.030*** 0.015* 0.002 -0.004 0.019*   
 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
Product innovation 0.028** -0.001 -0.008 -0.019 -0.056*** -(0.008) 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
Export 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.038* 0.050*** 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) 
Ln(size) 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.028*** 0.005 -0.022** 0.026*** 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
Year 2010 -0.047*** -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.023 -0.028*** 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) 
Constant 8.824*** 9.166*** 9.436*** 9.572*** 9.736*** 9.242*** 
 
(0.063) (0.044) (0.031) (0.036) (0.061) (0.046) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.185 0.182 0.186 0.196 0.205 0.291 
Observations 11979 
Notes: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant 
at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
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Table 6 
OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity in Family firms 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates  OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       FLB 0.076*** 0.047*** 0.064*** 0.074*** 0.093*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.035) (0.016) 
% executives -0.054 0.275*** 0.595*** 0.987*** 1.330*** 0.616*** 
 
(0.118) (0.090) (0.100) (0.090) (0.182) (0.084) 
%white collars 0.345*** 0.388*** 0.433*** 0.486*** 0.572*** 0.426*** 
 
(0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.027) (0.041) (0.023) 
% women -0.486*** -0.454*** -0.423*** -0.410*** -0.408*** -0.430*** 
 
(0.037) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.042) (0.023) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.548*** -0.462*** -0.359*** -0.237*** -0.204*** -0.396*** 
 
(0.077) (0.044) (0.035) (0.034) (0.059) (0.039) 
ln(firm seniority) (0.012) 0.022*** 0.019** 0.027*** 0.030** 0.023*** 
 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.048*** 0.02 0.017 0.001 -0.015 0.026**  
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) 
Product innovation 0.021 0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.026 -0.005 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) 
Export 0.100*** 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) 
Ln(size) 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.023*** -0.002 -0.036*** 0.013*   
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Year 2010 -0.113*** -0.074*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.074*** 
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) 
Constant 9.006*** 9.195*** 9.460*** 9.558*** 9.650*** 9.269*** 
 
(0.059) (0.051) (0.047) (0.053) (0.099) (0.047) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.193 0.184 0.178 0.181 0.184 0.298 
Observations 9492 
Notes: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level 
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Table 7 
OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity in Family Firms with family management 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates  OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       FLB 0.072*** 0.034 0.057*** 0.109** 0.077*** 0.072*** 
 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.017) (0.043) (0.017) (0.025) 
% executives -(0.117) 0.183** 0.528*** 1.038*** 0.481*** -(0.117) 
 
(0.099) (0.083) (0.071) (0.178) (0.083) (0.099) 
%white collars 0.358*** 0.400*** 0.436*** 0.595*** 0.427*** 0.358*** 
 
(0.035) (0.022) (0.019) (0.044) (0.024) (0.035) 
% women -0.496*** -0.457*** -0.422*** -0.397*** -0.426*** -0.496*** 
 
(0.038) (0.023) (0.024) (0.040) (0.024) (0.038) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.558*** -0.455*** -0.341*** -0.149** -0.382*** -0.558*** 
 
(0.090) (0.048) (0.032) (0.062) (0.041) (0.090) 
Ln(firm seniority) (0.008) 0.019** 0.021*** 0.026** 0.025*** (0.008) 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.092*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.136*** 0.119*** 0.092*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Process innovation 0.053*** 0.027* 0.02 -0.026 0.032*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (0.020) 
Product innovation (0.028) 0.01 -0.005 -0.019 -(0.003) (0.028) 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) (0.018) 
Export 0.094*** 0.083*** 0.064*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 0.094*** 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) 
Ln(size) 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.021*** -0.036*** 0.013*   0.052*** 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) 
Year 2010 -0.109*** -0.078*** -0.049*** -0.048** -0.074*** -0.109*** 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018) 
Constant 9.027*** 9.201*** 9.468*** 9.689*** 9.284*** 9.027*** 
 
(0.061) (0.054) (0.048) (0.088) (0.049) (0.061) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.192 0.181 0.172 0.174 0.175 0.289 
Observations 8745 
Notes: Notes: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 
level; *significant at .10 level 
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Table  8 
OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and labour productivity in No- Family firms 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates  OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       FLB 0.003 0.019 0.029 0.059** 0.059 0.029 
 
(0.039) (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) (0.048) (0.029) 
% executives 1.141*** 1.640*** 1.967*** 2.275*** 2.355*** 1.930*** 
 
(0.260) (0.135) (0.144) (0.188) (0.359) (0.155) 
%white collars 0.366*** 0.398*** 0.450*** 0.602*** 0.854*** 0.590*** 
 
(0.062) (0.046) (0.041) (0.062) (0.099) (0.056) 
% women -0.601*** -0.587*** -0.498*** -0.452*** -0.431*** -0.509*** 
 
(0.093) (0.042) (0.058) (0.065) (0.118) (0.060) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.649*** -0.435*** -0.348*** -0.133 0.124 -0.334*** 
 
(0.197) (0.102) (0.102) (0.134) (0.210) (0.111) 
Ln(firm seniority) -0.016 -0.006 -0.027* -0.014 -0.047* -0.030*   
 
(0.025) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.016) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.049*** 0.076*** 0.100*** 0.120*** 0.126*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) 
Process innovation 0.042 0.009 0.01 -0.015 0.082 -0.017 
 
(0.043) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.058) (0.028) 
Product innovation -0.012 0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -0.163*** -0.001 
 
(0.045) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.053) (0.028) 
Export 0.001 0.004* 0.027* 0.047* 0.029 0.018* 
 
(0.054) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.046) (0.030) 
Ln(size) 0.049** 0.026* -0.013 -0.052*** -0.101*** -0.02 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) 
Year 2010 -0.037 -0.006 -0.027 -0.032 -0.048 -0.022 
 
(0.042) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.047) (0.026) 
Constant 9.823*** 9.847*** 9.950*** 10.137*** 10.646*** 9.980*** 
 
(0.215) (0.109) (0.167) (0.159) (0.242) (0.147) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.117 0.160 0.184 0.206 0.232 0.256 
Observations 2450 
Notes: Notes: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 
level; *significant at .10 level 
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Table  9 
IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Productivity (whole sample) 
 
     
IV Quantile estimates   IV_2LAD   
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90   Q50   
      
     
FLB 0.685*** 0.475*** 0.437*** 0.466*** 0.646***   0.964***   
 
(0.129) (0.099) (0.079) (0.066) (0.109)   (0.109)   
% executives 1.174** 0.932** 1.181* 1.554** 2.152**   0.559***   
 
(0.513) (0.367) (0.653) (0.678) (1.009)   (0.177)   
%white collars 0.407*** 0.476 0.588*** 0.655*** 0.712**   0.504***   
 
(0.149) (0.291) (0.161) (0.164) (0.284)   (0.029)   
% women -0.579* -0.583** -0.587*** -0.525** -0.625**   0.377***   
 
(0.326) (0.294) (0.226) (0.231) (0.285)   (0.099)   
% fixed-term contracts -0.061 -0.060 -0.050 -0.016 0.225   -0.567***   
 
(0.403) (0.427) (0.282) (0.386) (0.479)   (0.111)   
Ln(firm seniority) 0.014 -0.032 -0.007 -0.003 -0.050   -0.310***   
 
(0.066) (0.109) (0.056) (0.068) (0.080)   (0.035)   
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.039 0.063 0.069* 0.091** 0.089   0.106***   
 
(0.040) (0.056) (0.040) (0.041) (0.059)   (0.005)   
Ln(size) 0.067 0.064 0.055 0.074 0.074   0.554***   
 
(0.068) (0.053) (0.052) (0.047) (0.078)   (0.064)   
Process innovation 0.226* 0.117 0.046 0.020 0.022   0.075***   
 
(0.119) (0.124) (0.088) (0.089) (0.158)   (0.021)   
Product innovation 0.170 0.103 0.106 0.055 0.034   0.012   
 
(0.148) (0.121) (0.099) (0.095) (0.146)   (0.015)   
Export 0.033 0.055 0.016* 0.064* 0.065   0.040**    
 
(0.164) (0.129) (0.009) (0.035) (0.114)   (0.017)   
Year 2010 -0.125 -0.211 -0.138 -0.090 -0.121   0.018   
 (0.128) (0.117) (0.069) (0.118) (0.188)   (0.016)   
Constant 8.743*** 9.163*** 9.364*** 9.240*** 9.519***   13.552***   
 
(0.695) (0.764) (0.473) (0.491) (0.735)   (0.446)   
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes   
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes   
      
     
Observations 4708  
Notes: IV (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level 
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Table  10 
IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Productivity (family firms) 
     
 IV Quantile estimates   IV_2LAD   
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90   Q50   
           
FLB 0.609*** 0.456*** 0.433*** 0.468*** 0.577***   0.683***   
 
(0.154) (0.103) (0.105) (0.099) (0.155)   (0.086)   
% executives 1.424*** 0.796** 1.119** 1.082 1.202   0.367*     
 
(0.403) (0.327) (0.483) (0.735) (0.957)   (0.217)   
%white collars 0.356 0.454* 0.432*** 0.434* 0.500   0.471***   
 
(0.426) (0.263) (0.148) (0.251) (0.327)   (0.035)   
% women 0.260 0.292 0.194 0.283 0.335   0.081   
 
(0.586) (0.435) (0.283) (0.414) (0.435)   (0.067)   
% fixed-term contracts -0.510* -0.551** -0.456* -0.489* -0.612   -0.494***   
 
(0.279) (0.241) (0.237) (0.275) (0.420)   (0.111)   
Ln(firm seniority) 0.046 0.002 0.037 0.049 0.082   -0.301***   
 
(0.236) (0.114) (0.084) (0.084) (0.143)   (0.045)   
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.068 0.078 0.074* 0.089** 0.090*   0.111***   
 
(0.056) (0.068) (0.042) (0.041) (0.053)   (0.006)   
Ln(size) 0.076 0.059 0.026 0.053 0.036   0.346***   
 
(0.078) (0.074) (0.041) (0.074) (0.099)   (0.044)   
Process innovation 0.156 0.016 -0.008 0.030 0.030   0.058**    
 
(0.121) (0.127) (0.103) (0.113) (0.177)   (0.025)   
Product innovation 0.200 0.104 0.072 0.023 0.048   0.010   
 
(0.247) (0.108) (0.099) (0.109) (0.191)   (0.016)   
Export 0.112 0.041 0.029* 0.060 0.099*   0.061***   
 
(0.140) (0.109) (0.017) (0.160) (0.053)   (0.021)   
Year 2010 -0.271* -0.181 -0.121 -0.120* -0.096   -0.019   
 (0.141) (0.109) (0.080) (0.072) (0.217)   (0.018)   
Constant 8.366*** 8.857*** 9.261*** 9.093*** 9.115***   12.563***   
 
(0.931) (1.146) (0.457) (0.544) (0.880)   (0.377)   
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes   
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes   
           Observations 2761  
  
Notes: IV (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level 
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Table 11  
IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Productivity (family Firms with family management) 
 
 
IV Quantile estimates  IV_2LAD 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
      
 
FLB 0.551*** 0.420*** 0.407*** 0.468*** 0.582*** 0.573*** 
 
(0.120) (0.119) (0.101) (0.105) (0.124) (0.070) 
% executives 1.403*** 0.836 1.314*** 1.028 1.279 0.529**  
 
(0.285) (1.151) (0.476) (0.649) (1.073) (0.217) 
%white collars 0.289 0.426* 0.420*** 0.362 0.445 0.514*** 
 
(0.349) (0.240) (0.136) (0.226) (0.385) (0.031) 
% women -0.002 0.261 0.211 0.280 0.430 -0.062 
 
(0.546) (0.421) (0.324) (0.435) (0.557) (0.054) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.617* -0.608*** -0.580** -0.530* -0.694** 0.332*** 
 
(0.318) (0.231) (0.256) (0.288) (0.344) (0.068) 
Ln(firm seniority) 0.043 -0.012 0.026 0.034 0.035 -0.259*** 
 
(0.172) (0.109) (0.086) (0.090) (0.134) (0.044) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.073* 0.071* 0.068** 0.090* 0.086 0.101*** 
 
(0.064) (0.057) (0.043) (0.052) (0.059) (0.007) 
Ln(size) 0.096 0.068 0.033 0.060 0.028 0.271*** 
 
(0.074) (0.069) (0.044) (0.069) (0.102) (0.036) 
Process innovation 0.214 0.043 -0.018 0.025 0.011 0.054**  
 
(0.205) (0.122) (0.096) (0.108) (0.215) (0.022) 
Product innovation 0.151 0.096 0.082 0.029 0.053 0.014 
 
(0.234) (0.115) (0.095) (0.098) (0.217) (0.017) 
Export 0.087 0.040 0.035* 0.049 0.111 0.044**  
 
(0.150) (0.119) (0.018) (0.161) (0.259) (0.020) 
Year 2010 -0.113 -0.047 -0.031 -0.040 -0.075 -0.025 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.073) (0.077) (0.125) (0.017) 
Constant 8.241*** 8.971*** 9.312*** 9.145*** 9.373*** 12.167*** 
 
(1.201) (0.864) (0.494) (0.583) (0.975) (0.339) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
Observations 2557 
Notes: IV (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level 
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Table 12 
IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Productivity  in No-Family family firms 
 IV Quantile estimates IV_2LAD 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
FLB 0.311** 0.210 0.217 0.248** 0.196 0.647*** 
 
(0.137) (0.133) (0.143) (0.104) (0.131) (0.174) 
% executives 1.999 2.060*** 2.391*** 1.987*** 2.194* 1.306*** 
 
(1.442) (0.654) (0.487) (0.346) (1.217) (0.325) 
%white collars 0.793 0.758* 0.905*** 0.965*** 0.859*** 0.634*** 
 
(0.527) (0.388) (0.348) (0.265) (0.306) (0.090) 
% women -0.451 -0.468 -0.587** -0.762** -0.559 -0.133 
 
(0.370) (0.396) (0.285) (0.299) (0.362) (0.166) 
 % fixed term contracts 0.129 -0.074 0.223 0.012 0.038 -0.372*   
 
(0.566) (0.446) (0.461) (0.366) (0.561) (0.191) 
Ln(firm seniority) -0.031 -0.037 -0.045 -0.127 -0.268** -0.357*** 
 
(0.113) (0.117) (0.110) (0.095) (0.125) (0.082) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.036 0.033 0.065 0.072* 0.104 0.106*** 
 
(0.037) (0.057) (0.064) (0.040) (0.073) (0.014) 
Ln(size) 0.076 0.071 0.079 0.058 0.007 0.351*** 
 
(0.102) (0.092) (0.090) (0.080) (0.207) (0.086) 
Process innovation 0.138 0.034 0.068 0.015 0.077 -0.097 
 
(0.278) (0.086) (0.184) (0.113) (0.174) (0.064) 
Product innovation 0.043 -0.018 -0.172 -0.187 -0.134 0.025 
 
(0.188) (0.136) (0.180) (0.132) (0.212) (0.059) 
Export 0.116 0.061 0.077 0.021 0.049 0.047 
 
(0.156) (0.132) (0.132) (0.103) (0.186) (0.042) 
Year 2010 -0.032 -0.043 -0.005 -0.056 -0.043 -0.022 
 
(0.138) (0.096) (0.117) (0.107) (0.183) (0.037) 
Constant 9.234*** 9.871*** 9.904*** 10.601*** 11.122*** 13.031*** 
 
(0.478) (0.877) (0.858) (0.654) (0.867) (0.773) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
Observations 782 
Notes: IV (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level 
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Appendix  
Table A.1 
Variable Definition 
FLB Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts a firm level bargaining (FLB), 0 otherwise. 
FF  
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
owned and or controlled by a family  (FF) and 0 
otherwise (NFF) 
FM 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the family  
firm is managed by family management  (FM) and 0 
otherwise (NFM) 
Ln (value added per capita) Log of value-added per employee (source AIDA) deflated by the value added deflator (source ISTAT) 
Ln (physical capital per 
capita) 
Log of capital stock per employee (source 
AIDA) deflated by the investment deflator (source 
ISTAT) 
n (Sales volatility)_1998-
2000 
Logarithm of the standard deviation of sales over 
the period 1998-2000 
% executives Percentage of managers and supervisors 
% white collars Percentage of white collar workers 
% blue-collars Percentage of manual workers  
% women Percentage of women among total workers 
% fixed-term contracts Percentage of fixed-term workers 
ln(firm seniority) Logarithm of the age of firms 
Process Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopted 
process innovations in the last three years, 0 
otherwise 
Product Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
originated new products in the last three years, 0 
otherwise 
Export Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm exported in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Firm Size   Logarithm of the number of employees at firm 
level 
North- West Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in North-Western regions, 0 otherwise 
North-East Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in North-Eastern regions, 0 otherwise 
Centre Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Central regions, 0 otherwise 
South Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Southern regions, 0 otherwise 
Sectors Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in sector shown in table1, 0 otherwise 
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Table A.2. IV Quantile Regressions 2_LAD: First Stage 
 Total Sample Family Firms 
Family Firms 
with 
Family 
management 
No Family 
Firms 
High Sales Volatility (1/0) 0.152*** 0.212** 0.253*** 0.082 
 (0.054) (0.083) (0.085) (0.127) 
% executives 1.131*** 1.268** 1.207** 0.424 
 (0.301) (0.570) (0.502) (0.610) 
%white collars -0.073 -0.087 -0.16 -0.451 
 (0.109) (0.130) (0.200) (0.282) 
% women -0.866*** -0.701*** -0.585*** -0.902*** 
 (0.134) (0.157) (0.171) (0.318) 
% fixed term contracts -0.775*** -0.777** -0.655* -1.174**  
 (0.244) (0.378) (0.338) (0.551) 
Ln(firm seniority) 0.326*** 0.467*** 0.483*** 0.189*   
 (0.054) (0.080) (0.092) (0.110) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) -0.005 -0.017 -0.007 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.041) 
Ln(size) 0.111** 0.147 0.171** 0.059 
 (0.051) (0.093) (0.086) (0.155) 
Process innovation -0.011 -0.042 -0.048 0.096 
 (0.054) (0.080) (0.083) (0.141) 
Product innovation 0.046 0.108* 0.085 -0.116 
 (0.062) (0.065) (0.074) (0.085) 
Export 0.538*** 0.464*** 0.428*** 0.595*** 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.048) (0.059) 
Year 2010 -0.07 -0.079 -0.068 -0.099 
 (0.046) (0.070) (0.068) (0.087) 
Constant -3.973*** -4.255*** -4.372*** -2.834*** 
 (0.335) (0.368) (0.415) (0.588) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 4708 2761 2557 782 
 
	  
